I. Introduction
Judicial notice is "the means by which a court may take as proven certain facts without hearing evidence". 1 The doctrine has had a signi cant but unhappy existence in international criminal law. In many respects its struggles are a product of the jurisdiction's adolescence: judicial notice is full of potential, fused with serious dangers and struggling to establish its own legitimate identity out of the preconceptions of its many parent legal systems. Its history is full of con ict, confusion, inconsistency and failures to intervene. The need for reconciliation is profound.
Although ensuring consistent factual ndings is an important function of judicial notice, its real potential lies in its ability to signi cantly expedite trial.
2 In his treatise on evidence, Thayer opined that "the failure to exercise [judicial notice] tends daily to smother trials with technicality and monstrously lengthens them out".
3 Those concerns are perhaps felt most profoundly in international criminal jurisdictions, where assessment of personal responsibility requires proof of a range of preliminary technicalities in the context of well founded criticism of the time taken to complete cases. 4 In LLB(Hons)/BA, Diplôme en droit international humanitaire (CICR). Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand.
1 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Law, 2nd edn., 1992 at 223. 2 According to Cross & Tapper on Evidence "There are at least two reasons why we should have a doctrine of judicial notice. In the rst place, it expedites the hearing of many cases. Much time would be wasted if every fact which was not admitted had to be the subject of evidence which would, in many instances, be costly or dif cult to obtain. Second, the doctrine tends to produce uniformity of decision on matters of fact where a diversity of ndings might sometimes be distinctly embarrassing". addition, the scope of judicial notice is much broader in a specialist jurisdiction speci cally established to try a small range or offences within a limited geographical and temporal sphere. 5 Thus, an ability to take certain matters as proven without hearing evidence is arguably more appropriate and valuable to international criminal law than any other jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the dangers inherent in the exercise of judicial notice are also particularly pronounced. In dispensing with formal proof, judicial notice might undermine the prosecutorial burden to prove an accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, represent an invasion of an accused's right to present a full and public defence and tend to crystallise what are commonly held but inaccurate historical views. The concerns are particularly serious in the context of international criminal prosecutions because invariably "the rst casualty of war is truth".
6
Unsurprisingly given the delicate standoff between the doctrine's potential and its peril, the Security Counsel appointed Expert Group charged with review of the functioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") recommended that: 7 "Further consideration should be given to greater use of judicial notice in a manner that fairly protects the rights of the accused and at the same time reduces or eliminates the need for identical repetitive testimony and exhibits in successive cases".
As will be seen, that challenge has not been well met.
II. The basis for judicial notice
Although judicial notice is traditionally a common law concept, 8 several civil law jurisdictions also incorporate procedural mechanisms that dispense with
